



Federal criminal procedure regularly struggles with a tension between fair-
ness and finality. The Constitution provides defendants with special privileges
and protections designed to prevent injustice, but systemic concerns about
efficiency, comity, and finality make it impossible to guarantee a perfect and er-
rorless trial to every defendant.2 Given the impossibility of perfection, and the
tremendous burden associated with carefully scrutinizing each page of each tri-
al transcript, appellate courts rely on defendants to flag possible errors as they
arise. One manifestation of that reliance is the fact that the rigor of appellate
review often depends on whether the defendant-appellant objected to the pur-
ported error at trial.3
1. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (containing the Grand Jury Clause, the Double Jeopardy
Clause, and the Self-Incrimination Clause); id. amend. VI (containing the rights to a speedy
trial, a jury trial, the confrontation of witnesses, a compulsory process for obtaining witness-
es, and the assistance of counsel); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (holding that
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is a constitutional requirement in criminal cases).
2. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-21 (1987) (discussing the importance of
the "finality" of the criminal justice system and the impossibility of "perfect[ing]" it); Unit-
ed States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983) (discussing Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967), which established the standard for "harmless error"). But see Arizona v. Ful-
minante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (distinguishing quotidian "trial errors" from "struc-
tural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by 'harmless-
error' standards").
3. The Supreme Court has explained that "[i]f an error is not properly preserved" by a timely
objection in the trial court, then "appellate-court authority to remedy the error ... is strictly
circumscribed .... '[E]rrors are a constant in the trial process ... [and] a reflexive inclina-
tion by appellate courts to reverse because of unpreserved error would be fatal'" Puckett v.
United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009) (quoting United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211, 224
(ist Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C.J., concurring)); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b).
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In United States v. Bostic,4 the Sixth Circuit, aiming to facilitate appellate re-
view of sentencing, adopted a prudent procedural rule: the "Bostic Question"
("the Question").' Invoking its "supervisory powers over the district courts,"
the court of appeals issued the following instructions:
[D]istrict courts, after pronouncing the defendant's sentence but before
adjourning the sentencing hearing, [must] ask the parties whether they
have any objections to the sentence just pronounced that have not previously
been raised. If the district court fails to provide the parties with this op-
portunity, they will not have forfeited their objections and thus will not
be required to demonstrate plain error on appeal. If a party does not
clearly articulate any objection and the grounds upon which the objec-
tion is based, when given this final opportunity to speak, then that par-
ty will have forfeited its opportunity to make any objections not previ-
ously raised and thus will face plain error review on appeal.6
The Sixth Circuit explained that the Question would serve at least two
purposes: (1) "permitting the district court to correct on the spot any error it
may have made," and (2) "guiding appellate review" of the sentence imposed.'
This Comment endorses these rationales and also draws attention to a third
justification, heretofore unrecognized. The Question promotes what Lani
Guinier and Gerald Torres have called "demosprudence" -that is, "a democra-
cy-enhancing jurisprudence" grounded not only in "logical reasoning [and] le-
gal principles" but also in a need to "inform and [be] informed by the wisdom
of the people."' It does so by inviting oral objections to, and public dialogue
about, the sentence imposed by the district court. Further, it tends to "expand
the audience for judicial decisionmaking and to engage that audience in demo-
cratic deliberation" about criminal law and procedure.'
4. 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004).
5. On occasion, the Sixth Circuit also uses the terms "Bostic rule" or "Bostic requirement." See,
e.g., United States v. Daniels, 641 F. App'x 481, 487 (6th Cir. 2016) (using both); United
States v. Vonner, 516 F.3 d 382, 399 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Clay, J., dissenting) (using
"Bostic rule"). As discussed infra text accompanying notes 33-34, the Bostic Question was in-
spired by a nearly identical rule in the Eleventh Circuit.
6. Bostic, 371 F.3 d at 872-73 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
7. Id. at 873 (quoting United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1102 (11th Cir. 1990), overruled on
other grounds by United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993)).
8. Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court 2oo7 Term -Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122
HARV. L. REV. 4, 15-16 (2008); see Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes
Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740 (2014).
9. Guinier, supra note 8, at 16.
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This Comment aspires to persuade all federal courts of appeals to adopt the
Bostic Question as a requirement for the district courts under their supervision.
Part I explains why standards of appellate review have become important in the
sentencing context and why, as a result, the Question is necessary. Part II first
articulates reasons why courts have been reluctant to follow the Sixth Circuit's
lead and then proceeds to a two-part normative case for the Bostic Question:
the Question is sound judicial policy that produces real benefits at a minimal
cost, and it has the potential to advance demosprudential values.
I. APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCING ERRORS
Federal criminal appeals usually fail,1 o especially when the reviewing court
applies plain-error review, or a similarly deferential standard." The standard of
review, some judges have stated, "is everything," and it "more often than not
determines the outcome."12 On plain-error review, in the Seventh Circuit's
words, a decision is reversible only if it "strike [s] [the court] as wrong with the
force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish."
The scope of appellate deference has evolved in the decade since United
States v. Booker.14 Before Booker, the statutory Sentencing Guidelines were
mandatory, and departures from the Guidelines were reviewed de novo on ap-
peal." But Booker shifted power from prosecutors to judges, 16 rendering the
Guidelines advisory and affording district courts more discretion to depart
10. See, e.g., Table B-5 : U.S. Courts of Appeals-Appeals Terminated on the Merits, by
Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2012, U.S. CTs. (2012), http://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-5/judicial-business/2o12/o9/30 [http://perma.cc
/C 7JD-YW3A] (reporting just a seven percent reversal rate of criminal proceedings across all
courts of appeals).
n1. See Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
643, 680 (2015) ("When a criminal defendant fails to object at trial, such that a district court
judge has no warning of a potential problem, appellate judges may be exceedingly reluctant
to undo their colleague's hard work. This hesitance may well surpass whatever caution an
appellate judge would exercise before overturning a lower court decision reviewed for abuse
of discretion."). Of course, not all courts of appeals "necessarily treat deference identically."
Id. at 661.
12. Id. at 657 (quoting Judge Tacha, of the Tenth Circuit, and Judge Wald, of the D.C. Circuit).
13. Id. at 658 (quoting Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7 th
Cir. 1988)).
14. 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (rendering the Federal Sentencing Guidelines merely advisory for dis-
trict judges and establishing a "reasonableness" standard for appellate review of sentences).
15. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007).
16. See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117




from Congress's recommendations. Today, if a defendant timely objects to an
error, the standard on appeal is clear: "reasonableness," a standard essentially
coextensive with "abuse of discretion."" But if the defendant fails to object, or
objects only indistinctly, courts of appeals apply plain-error review to those
"unpreserved" claims of error-that is, alleged errors to which the defendant
did not make a contemporaneous objection at trial. " In the particular context
of sentencing, some disparity persists, but there is an emerging consensus."9
Unpreserved procedural reasonableness claims receive only plain-error review,20
while substantive reasonableness claims, even if unpreserved, are reviewed
through the same abuse-of-discretion lens as preserved claims.21
In the sentencing context, it is increasingly critical to scrutinize these stand-
ards of review. After all, in the twenty-first century, American criminal justice is
"a world of guilty pleas, not trials."2 2 The vast majority of federal prosecutions
17. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) ("[We] expla[ined] in Booker that appel-
late 'reasonableness' review merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion. . . .").
Gall, too, suggests that "abuse of discretion" review and "reasonableness" review are essen-
tially identical. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see also Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth
Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30 CARDOzO L. REV. 775, 775 (2008) ("[A]ppellate
courts . . . must review all sentences individually and deferentially for abuse of discretion.").
18. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52 ('Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect sub-
stantial rights must be disregarded . . .. A plain error that affects substantial rights may be
considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention.").
ig. As recently as 2010, the circuit split was more tangled. See Benjamin K. Raybin, Note, "Ob-
jection: Your Honor Is Being Unreasonable!"-Law and Policy Opposing the Federal Sentencing
Order Objection Requirement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 235, 244-50 (2010). Since Raybin's survey,
however, several circuits have decided to impose plain-error review for unpreserved proce-
dural-unreasonableness claims. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 257 (3d
Cir. 2014) (en banc) ("Our new rule is consistent with the holdings of most other circuit
courts of appeals that have ruled on the issue.").
20. See Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3 d at 257-58 (collecting cases). But see United States v. Howard, No.
15-4533, 2016 WL 519119, at *1 ( 4 th Cir. Feb. io, 2016) ("Offering '§ 3553 arguments [before
the sentence's imposition] in the district court for a different sentence than the one he re-
ceived' is sufficient to 'preserve [the defendant's] claim of procedural sentencing error on
appeal."' (quoting United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3 d 572, 581 (4 th Cir. 2010))); Flores-Mejia,
759 F.3 d at 259-66 (Greenaway, J., dissenting) (assailing the majority for abandoning circuit
precedent and adopting a procedural-unreasonableness objection requirement).
21. Only in the Fifth Circuit must defendants lodge a post-imposition substantive-
reasonableness objection to avoid plain-error review. See United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3 d
389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007). Six other circuits do not require objections to preserve a sub-
stantive-reasonableness claim. See United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 228 (1st Cir.
2015) (collecting cases). In Ruiz-Huertas, the First Circuit took note of the circuit split but
declined to pick a side. See id. at 228 & n.4 ("We need not resolve this apparent anomaly to-
day.").
22. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas,
110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1100 (2001).
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end in guilty pleas, and therefore the vast majority of defendants appear in
open court only for sentencing before a judge -never a jury of their peers. 2 3
Judges are under no obligation to follow whatever sentencing recommendation
the government and defendant may have agreed upon,24 and so even defend-
ants who are pleading guilty in exchange for sentencing considerations are ex-
posed to the possibility of judicial error.
When broad judicial discretion is combined with the requirement to lodge
objections to preserve errors for appeal, odd situations can arise. Consider a
normal federal sentencing hearing. The prosecution and the defense have as-
sembled the Presentence Report; the attorneys have offered their final oral ar-
guments; and the district court, after deliberation and with solemn gravitas,
has announced the defendant's sentence. Haggling with a judge after a ruling is
rarely a wise lawyering choice, and yet in this context any competent defense
attorney would promptly object.25 Thus, objecting to a freshly imposed sen-
tence is both obligatory and awkward.26 Enter the Bostic Question.
II. THE VIRTUES OF THE BOSTIC QUESTION
The Tenth and D.C. Circuits have dismissed the Bostic Question as "gratui-
tous superintendence" -unnecessary procedural handholding for lawyers
whom the legal system assumes to be "competent professionals." 27 But these
courts' opposition is misguided. As I argue in this Part, the Question has two
principal virtues. First, it facilitates efficient, informed, and accurate appellate
review, which improves the fairness and finality of criminal sentences. Second,
it has the heretofore unrecognized potential to advance demosprudential values
23. See, e.g., Criminal Cases, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/types
-cases/criminal-cases [http://perma.cc/QAE3-B7RG] ("More than 90 percent of defendants
plead guilty rather than go to trial."); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2o14/11/2o/why-innocent
-people-plead-guilty [http://perma.cc/K89J-8RJ2] ("In 2013, while 8 percent of all federal
criminal charges were dismissed . .. more than 97 percent of the remainder were resolved
through plea bargains . . . . The plea bargains largely determined the sentences imposed.").
24. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6Bi.i(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016)
("To the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in [Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure] 11(c)(1) (B), the court must advise the defendant that the defendant has no right to
withdraw the plea if the court does not follow the recommendation or request.").
25. See Raybin, supra note 19, at 236-37.
26. See id. at 236 (remarking upon the nonsensical fact that "[t] his sentencing order objection
requirement is mandatory even if the party had presented all appropriate arguments earlier
during the sentencing hearing").
27. See United States v. Hunter, 809 F.3 d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v.




and help to create a sentencing regime that emerges from a dialogue involving
not only legal elites but also the people and their elected representatives.
A. The Bostic Question and Its Critics
The Bostic Question, in large part, responds to the awkward situation de-
scribed at the end of Part I.28 In Bostic, the Sixth Circuit noted that the Federal
Rules do not penalize a claim with plain-error appellate review if the appellant
had "no opportunity" to object below.29 Thus, the court decided it would be
prudent to require district courts affirmatively to invite objections after pro-
nouncing a sentence.o This rule, the court said, would save appellate courts
from "the difficulty of parsing a transcript" to determine whether each party
had been afforded "a meaningful opportunity to object."" The rule would also
"serve the dual purposes of permitting the district court to correct on the spot
any error it may have made and of guiding appellate review."3 2
The Sixth Circuit borrowed the idea for the Bostic Question from the Elev-
enth Circuit." That court has similarly praised the Question's ability to facili-
tate appellate review by eliciting "fully articulated objections" and to give the
district court an opportunity to correct errors on the spot.34 But other courts,
regrettably, have been reluctant to follow suit. Some have offered a lukewarm
endorsement of the Question but have declined to require it." Others have re-
jected it outright.36 The Tenth Circuit, for example, directly rejected the idea:
"Competent professionals do not require such gratuitous superintendence; as
28. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
29. United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 5 1(b) "excuses the failure to object if that party had no opportunity to do so").
30. Id. at 872-73.
31. Id. at 872 n.6.
32. Id. at 873 (internal quotation marks and other marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1102 (11th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993)).
33. See id. at 872 n.6.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Louissant, 558 F. App'x 893, 894-95 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
(unpublished opinion) (quotingJones, 899 F.2d at 1102).
35. See United States v. Hunter, 809 F.3 d 677, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 2016); United States v. Flores-
Mejia, 759 F.3 d 253, 258 n.8 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) ("To ensure that timely objections are
made, we encourage district courts at sentencing to inquire of counsel whether there are any
objections to procedural matters. However, unlike the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals, we will not make this a requirement that district judges must follow. We believe
that the burden of objecting to errors remains with the parties." (citations omitted)).
36. See United States v. Steele, 603 F.3d 803, 807 (loth Cir. 2010); United States v.
Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 934 ( 9 th Cir. 2009).
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long as there is a fair opportunity to register an objection, ask for an explana-
tion or request factual findings, counsel must take the initiative thereby
[e] nsuring that silence is not mistaken for acceptance.""
The Tenth Circuit's concern appears to underlie the misgivings of the other
courts that have rejected the Question." There is such a thing as too much
handholding, the argument goes, and district courts should not have to bear an
additional burden on top of the "numerous requirements" that already exist in
the sentencing context." As I explain in the next Section, I find that concern
puzzling and unpersuasive, because the Question, applied broadly, will improve
efficiency and reduce the burden that resentencing imposes on district courts.
B. Facilitating Efficient and Accurate Appellate Review
Courts of appeals ought to be concerned with generating and preserving as
comprehensive a district court record as possible. By affirmatively eliciting ob-
jections from the parties - that is, by saying something more specific and solici-
tous than "Anything further?"40 -the district court can (1) make clear when the
required "opportunity to object" is at hand;4 1 (2) help to avert the possibility of
a confusing web of standards of review on appeal;42 and (3) spark a dialogue
that is likely to clarify further the reasonableness, or lack thereof, of the court's
decision making.4 3
To be sure, most attorneys who represent criminal defendants at sentencing
hearings are competent enough to lodge the objections that could be useful on
appeal, so the Bostic Question may indeed be "gratuitous" in certain circum-
stances. But the annoyance-if any-caused by the Question is insignificant
compared to the benefits it can confer.
Consider, as a concrete example, a recent Eleventh Circuit case.44 John Val-
era was caught paying a friend to use a "skimmer" to steal credit-card infor-
37. Steele, 603 F.3 d at 807.
38. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
39. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3 d at 258.
40. Steele, 603 F.3 d at 806.
41. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
42. See United States v. Cortis-Medina, 819 F.3 d 566, 574 n.io (1st Cir. 2016) (Lipez, J., dissent-
ing) (urging the First Circuit to implement the Bostic Question and opining that "such a
rule ... would have avoided, or at least minimized, the confusing jumble of standards
deemed applicable by the majority").
43. See infra Section II.C.
44. United States v. Valera, 622 F. App'x 876, 876 (ith Cir. 2015) (unpublished opinion). Recall
that the Eleventh Circuit has its own counterpart to the Bostic Question. See supra notes 33-




mation from customers.4 5 He pleaded guilty to access-device fraud, an offense
exposing him to an advisory range of twelve to eighteen months' imprison-
ment under the Sentencing Guidelines.4 6 The district court, having given the
defense no notice that it was considering an upward variance,47 imposed a six-
ty-month sentence4 at a seven-minute sentencing hearing.4 9 Rather than elicit-
ing objections to the sentence it had just imposed, the court simply asked "Mr.
Chang?" and then "directed the courtroom deputy to call the next case."so
The Eleventh Circuit was palpably frustrated with the consequences of the
district court's haste and had no choice but to vacate and remand. The district
court, disregarding Gall,s" had failed to identify the correct Guidelines range,52
had evinced no meaningful consideration of the section 3553(a) factors," and
had given minimal explanation for its decision to issue a sentence dramatically
above that recommended by the Guidelines.54 Consequently, the court of ap-
peals was "unable to determine with any certainty" the rationale behind the
district court's sentencing decision, because the record was "insufficient for
meaningful review" of the "procedural errors and abnormalities" that appeared
to have occurred." Although one cannot know how the Bostic Question would
have affected Valera's first sentencing hearing, there is a reasonable chance that
the Question would have prompted a dialogue, or at least a more substantive
explanation, for the Eleventh Circuit to review.
A Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Fout,56 illustrates how the Bostic Ques-
tion can help prevent inefficient and frustrating sentencing appeals like in Val-
era. Steven Fout pleaded guilty to possessing and distributing child pornogra-
phy, and his Guidelines range was 151 to 188 months. 7 The district court
45. Brief of the United States at 2-4, Valera, 622 F. App'x 876 (No. 15-10084-BB), 2015 WL
1950947, at *2-3.
46. Valera, 622 F. App'x at 88o.
47. Id. at 879 1.2.
48. Id. at 876.
49. Id. at 878 n.1.
50. Id. at 877 ("As the deputy began calling the next case, defense counsel attempted to object to
the reasonableness of Valera's sentence, but was interrupted mid-statement by the court's
terse comment, 'They're noted."').
51. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); see supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
52. Valera, 622 F. App'x at 878-79.
53. Id. at 879-80.
54. Id. at 881.
55- Id.
56. 614 F. App'x 335 (6th Cir. 2015).
57. Id. at 336.
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rejected Fout's arguments for a downward departure and sentenced him to 151
months." The district court then asked the Bostic Question, in response to
which Fout "objected to certain statements made about his alleged involvement
with minors" and to "the court's use of the online chat transcripts to reach a
conclusion about [his] level of functioning.""' These objections gave the dis-
trict court an opportunity to clarify that, while it had made an "incorrect refer-
ence to involvement with minors," that reference had not influenced its deter-
mination of Fout's sentence. 6 0 The court also used that opening to explain that,
far from ignoring Fout's mitigating evidence, the court had taken that evidence
into account by deciding to impose a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines
range.6 1 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit-unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Valera-
had the luxury of reviewing a clear statement of the district court's reasoning.6 2
To be clear, when the Question is properly applied,63 defendants lucky
enough to have attentive counsel should not be the only ones to benefit. The
focus of the Bostic inquiry on appeal is simply whether the court afforded coun-
sel an adequate opportunity to object - not whether counsel managed to articu-
late those objections with sufficient clarity to preserve them. If counsel misses
or squanders the Bostic opportunity, his client will face plain-error review, but
ought to be no worse off in that regard than if the Bostic Question had never
been asked at all.
In that vein, the Sixth Circuit, having taken two steps forward by imple-
menting the Bostic Question, subsequently took a step back in United States v.
Vonner.64 There, the court signaled that defendants who have already presented
section 3553(a) arguments earlier in the hearing must object again on procedur-
al grounds, after the Bostic Question, if they wish to avoid plain-error review. 6 5
The majority reasoned that it would "undermine [the Question's] effective-
ness" if the court did not "impos [e] any consequences on a party's failure to an-
swer it."66
58. Id. at 336-37.
59. Id. at 337.
6o. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 338-39.
63. To interpret the Bostic Question as requiring attorneys to reiterate previously raised objec-
tions is to undercut its effectiveness significantly. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying
text.
64. 516 F.3 d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
65. Id. at 386-87.




This conclusion follows only if one sees the proper effect of the Bostic Ques-
tion as imposing a formalistic procedural rule upon defendants. Instead, as the
Vonner dissenters pointed out, the purpose of the Bostic Question is to add op-
portunities for objection and colloquy,67 not to wipe the slate clean of proce-
dural objections already raised and thereby penalize defendants with inatten-
tive or incompetent attorneys. To insist otherwise, as did the Vonner majority, is
to "create a trap for unwary defendants."6 8 It is regrettable that the Vonner ma-
jority misinterpreted the Question as a double-edged sword, rather than as a
clarity-seeking device that benefits both defendants and courts.
Nor does the "additive" understanding of the Question undermine its abil-
ity to promote efficiency. Even if the Bostic Question does not force defendants
to renew all their objections at a single spot in the sentencing transcript-
thereby requiring appellate judges to search for valid objections in that tran-
script -the court of appeals is no worse off in that regard than it would be oth-
erwise. And the Question's purpose is not only to clarify and enumerate the de-
fendant's objections, but also, where appropriate, to clarify or correct the judge's
reasoning. A district judge's concise response to a post-sentence objection can
be helpful, as in Fout, to a reviewing court that might otherwise have to piece
together the judge's reasoning from statements scattered throughout the hear-
ing transcript.
The Vonner majority also erred in implying that defendants will have no in-
centive to respond meaningfully to the Bostic Question if they are not obligated
to reassert their procedural reasonableness objections.6 9 To the contrary, de-
fendants will retain a significant incentive to identify sentencing errors
promptly, or at least to elicit further explanation about the court's decision
making. When a district court offers an explanation for a harsh sentence that is
"recondite at best,"o no one benefits - neither the defendant nor the appellate
judges who are left with precious few "reasons" with which to evaluate "rea-
sonableness."
For reasons that the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have articulated, I encour-
age the Sixth Circuit, as well as its sister circuits, to return to the original con-
ception of the Bostic Question.
67. Id. at 399 (Clay, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 398 (quoting United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d430, 433-34 (7 th Cir. 2005)).
69. Id. at 390-92 (majority opinion).
70. United States v. Cortis-Medina, 819 F.3 d 566, 571 (1st Cir. 2016).
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C. Fostering Demosprudential Values
In addition to the Bostic Question's tendency to facilitate efficient and accu-
rate appellate review, there is a second and underexplored argument in its fa-
vor: it promotes demosprudential values. "Demosprudence" is a methodologi-
cal concept borrowed from Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, who define it as
"the study of the dynamic equilibrium of power between lawmaking and social
movements."" Guinier and Torres distinguish demosprudence, which "focuses
on the ways that ongoing collective action by ordinary people can ... chang[e]
the people who make the law and the landscape in which that law is made,"
from "jurisprudence, which analyzes the work of judges acting in formal sites
such as courts."72
When I refer to "demosprudential values" in this Comment, I have two
broad (and interrelated) concepts in mind: dialogue and participation. By "dia-
logue," I principally mean dialogue between legal and nonlegal actors that im-
proves understanding between those two groups, whose ability to communi-
cate with one another is often hindered by the complexity of the law or legal
jargon." By "participation," I mean ordinary people's engagement with demo-
cratic processes -not only by voting, but also by effecting political and social
change through group mobilization. I consider a law or rule "demosprudential"
if it opens up new opportunities for such participation or if it simply tends to
motivate and mobilize ordinary citizens. Publicly sourced power often effects
more fundamental change than could arise from legal institutions alone. Be-
cause the authority and legitimacy of the law and of the courts emanate from
the people, the "dynamic equilibrium" that Guinier and Torres envision can
withstand stronger shocks when people participate in the process of effectuat-
ing change.74
One example of demosprudence that can have an especially potent effect is
what Guinier has called "demosprudence through dissent."7 ' For example, Su-
preme Court dissents read from the bench, although without power to alter the
71. Guinier & Torres, supra note 8, at 2749.
72. Id. at 2750.
73. See id. at 2752 ("Demosprudence is in the nature of an acid bath to remove the corrosion that
has isolated the realm of the state from the legitimizing power of the people, except as it is
expressed through conventional partisan politics and the act of representation by elites.").
74. See id. at 2742 (borrowing a metaphor from Rev. Jim Wallis: "I say here's how you recognize
a member of Congress. They're the ones walking around with their fingers up in the air.
And then they lick their finger and they put it back up and they see which way the wind is
blowing. You can't change a nation by replacing one wet-fingered politician with another.
You change a nation when you change the wind").




Court's judgment, can serve other functions: telling a "public story" that is "or-
ganized around values, critique, or actions" more than pure logic, and speaking
to "non-judicial actors" in a manner that invites them to "step in or step up to
revisit the majority's conclusions."7 6
Judicial dissents, to be sure, are not the only activities with demospruden-
tial potential. From the perspective of nonlegal actors, "culture shifting"
through political activism and mobilization might have more demosprudential
potential than "rule shifting."" And from the perspective of legal actors, one
might view as demosprudential any activity that tends to invite the public to
exert influence on the law or the bounds of legal decision making, or to amelio-
rate ordinary individuals' understanding of the law and legal institutions. The
jury is an obvious example. Jury service not only allows ordinary citizens to ex-
press the public's conception of justice with respect to an individual case, but
also informs jurors about the contours of the law and encourages them to re-
spond democratically if they wish to change the status quo."
The Bostic Question, viewed from a broad and systemic perspective, also
has potential to foster these demosprudential values. In one sense, the Ques-
tion invites "dissent": it encourages advocates to lodge objections to the sen-
tence imposed by the court. In another sense, the Question invites dialogue: it
encourages the court to offer clarification and further explanation of its reason-
ing and decision-making processes -just as occurred in Fout." Viewed through
either lens, the Question tends to provide the public with more information
about the dynamics of sentencing decisions and to encourage more publicly ac-
cessible discussion of the statutory and discretionary factors that dictate sen-
tencing outcomes. And if one accepts the premise that participation is desirable
in the sentencing context -that "the demos" can, and should, contribute to the
76. Id. at 49. Guinier argues that this sort of dissent, if executed thoughtfully and effectively, is
not "[m] ere public grandstanding" but rather "a powerful pedagogical opportunity to open
up space for public deliberation and engagement." Id. at 51.
77. Guinier & Torres, supra note 8, at 2752; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text (de-
scribing the importance of changing the underlying political climate instead of one's political
representatives). Social movements during the Civil Rights Movement-for example, the
Montgomery Bus Boycotters and California's United Farm Workers -played an integral role
in "forg[ing] new understandings of the status quo," "chang[ing] norms," and "creating an
alternative narrative of constitutional meaning." Guinier & Torres, supra note 8, at 2756-57.
78. Juries serve not only a fact-finding function but also a demosprudential one: the institution
of the jury both engages nonlawyer citizens in criminal justice and educates them about the
law and its consequences. See John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The
Disappearance of Criminal Jury Trial, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 124 (1992). The ever-
increasing scarcity of the jury trial makes it all the more desirable to favor demosprudential
procedures at a defendant's sentencing -in open court.
79. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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development of both criminal law and legislative sentencing guidelines - then
one ought to support a procedure that provokes discussion not only between
legal elites but also between the court and a wider public audience.o
To understand this function of the Bostic Question more concretely, consid-
er another Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Thomas." Kenneth Thomas was
convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to 240 months in prison -the statuto-
ry maximum.2 After announcing the sentence, the district court elicited objec-
tions only halfheartedly, rather than properly asking the Bostic Question." Ap-
propriately applying abuse-of-discretion review, the Sixth Circuit vacated
Thomas's sentence, finding that the district court had "never mentioned any-
thing resembling the section 3553(a) factors, save a conclusory reference to
'considering the additional factors contained within ... Section 3553(a)."'84
Had the district court used the Bostic Question to elicit objections from
Thomas's counsel, perhaps the story would have been the same. However, the
Question could also have prompted Thomas's counsel to challenge the court's
perfunctory treatment of the section 3553(a) factors, which in turn would have
prompted the court to reconsider the sentence or, more likely, to provide a
more robust explanation of the court's decision making. At a minimum, the
Bostic Question would have opened up space for Thomas (or the government,
for that matter) to react to the sentence and elicit further clarification. Even if a
district court has committed no reversible error - as is usually the case - this
dialogue has intrinsic value.
so. Frederick Schauer has written that, as a general matter, "giving reasons" for legal outcomes
"may be a sign of respect" for the subject of the decision and can enhance the decision's legit-
imacy:
[W]hen decisionmakers expect voluntary compliance, or when they expect re-
spect for decisions because the decisions are right rather than because they ema-
nate from an authoritative source, then giving reasons becomes a way to bring the
subject of the decision into the enterprise. Even if compliance is not the issue, giv-
ing reasons is still a way of showing respect for the subject, and a way of opening
a conversation rather than forestalling one.
Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 658 (1995); see also Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007) ("Judicial decisions are reasoned decisions. Confidence in a
judge's use of reason underlies the public's trust in the judicial institution. A public state-
ment of those reasons helps provide the public with the assurance that creates that trust.").
81. 498 F.3 d 33 6 (6th Cir. 2007).
82. Id. at 338-39.
83. Id. at 340 ("In this case, the district court asked Thomas's counsel, 'Do you have anything
further for the record, Mr. Canady?' We have previously determined that a similar question






Such dialogue does more than create a more robust transcript for appellate
courts to parse. It also facilitates reaction to, and dialogue about, the manner in
which the judge synthesized the facts and then applied the Guidelines or other
relevant law. Members of the public-whether the defendant, those attending
the hearing, or recipients of secondhand news -benefit in the aggregate when
they gain access to more information about the law and legal institutions that
bind them. At a time in American history when criminal sentencing reform is
widely viewed as a necessary," but still politically fraught,8 6 topic, we ought to
seize opportunities to tie public participation and mobilization more closely to
the realities of sentencing procedure and judicial decision making.
CONCLUSION
The Bostic Question manages to promote both fairness and finality at
once -no small feat in criminal procedure. District courts using the Question
will be more likely to correct errors on the spot, more likely to record a more
complete account of their reasoning for appellate courts to evaluate, and more
likely to "enhance [courts'] democratic potential"" and accountability for sen-
tencing outcomes. I urge all courts to seize this opportunity to reap considera-
ble benefits at a minimal cost.
CHARLES C. BRIDGE*
85. See, e.g., Inimai Chettiar, Don't Lock Up Prison Reform: Congress' Fight over the Supreme
Court Shouldn't Doom Desperately Needed Sentencing Reform, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 7, 2016,
12:15 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2o16-o3-o7/supreme-court-battle
-shouldnt-kill-criminal-justice-sentencing-reform [http://perma.cc/JQ4K-W7BH].
86. See, e.g., Lydia Wheeler, Trump Marks Change for Criminal Justice Reform, HILL
(Nov. 27, 2016) http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3o7377-trump-marks
-change-for-criminal-justice-reform [http://perma.cc/23AL-WX4B] (speculating as to
whether the "bipartisan agreement that many aspects of our criminal justice system need re-
form" will result in new legislation under the Trump Administration).
87. Guinier & Torres, supra note 8, at 2756.
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